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PERSISTENT NONVIOLENT CONFLICT
WITH NO RECONCILIATION:
THE FLEMISH AND WALLOONS IN
BELGIUM
ROBERT MNOOKIN*
ALAIN VERBEKE**
I
BYE–BYE BELGIUM?
On December 13, 2006, Belgium’s French-speaking public television
network RTBF interrupted its regular programming with breaking news that
Flanders had declared its independence, the Belgian state was breaking apart,
and the King had left the country for the Congo. Inspired by Orson Welles’ The
War of the Worlds, a ninety-minute news special followed that touched upon a
possibility somewhat less fanciful than an invasion from Mars. CNBC reported
it as news.1 Some foreign embassies sent worried messages back home.
Thousands of ordinary Belgians made panicked phone calls. The next morning
many Belgian politicians condemned the show as a “bad joke” that might open
a Pandora’s Box by making discussable a topic that had long been somewhat
taboo—the possible dissolution of the Belgian state because of the persistent
conflict between the French-speaking Walloons and the Dutch-speaking
Flemish.2
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1. Monique Juquois-Delpierre, Fictional Reality or Real Fiction: How Can One Decide?: The
Strengths and Weaknesses of Information Science Concepts and Methods in the Media World, 5 J. INFO.
COMM. & ETHICS SOC’Y 235, 237 (2007).
2. For political reactions reported the day after the program, see Reacties. Vlaanderen, DE
STANDAARD, Dec. 14, 2006, available at http://www.standaard.be/Artikel/Detail.aspx?artikelId=DMF1
3122006_098&word=RTBF. The TV program was followed by a book, released the following day.
PHILIPPE DUTILLEUL, BYE–BYE BELGIUM (OPÉRATION BBB): L’ÉVENÉMENT TÉLÉVISUEL (2006).
The word “Flemish” is used as a noun both to denote the people and the language, which today is a
variant of Dutch. It also can be used as an adjective, for example, the “Flemish Region” or “Flemish
Community.”
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The most striking feature of contemporary Belgium is a language cleavage
that is territorial. Out of a population of about ten million, about forty percent
speak French as their mother tongue and about sixty percent speak Dutch.3 In
the south—the Walloon region—nearly everyone speaks French;4 in the north—
Flanders—the language is Dutch.5 This linguistic divide has existed since the
Roman Empire and has changed little since the eleventh century.6 In the center,
the capital, Brussels, is officially bilingual, but the vast majority of its
inhabitants are Francophones.
Any notion that the conflict between the Flemish and the Walloons was a
thing of the past, of little contemporary relevance, was blown away by the
controversy concerning the “Manifesto for an Independent Flanders Within
Europe,” a 252-page report issued at the end of 2005.7 The argument of the
Manifesto can be easily summarized:
1. Flanders and Wallonia have divergent needs and goals because they
have profound differences—political, economic, social, and cultural.8
2. The two regions are artificially held together only by a “maladjusted
and inefficient” federal governmental structure with antimajoritarian
restrictions and “chaotic distribution of powers.”9
3. As a result of this structure, rational and efficient policymaking is
impossible, and Flanders is unable to adopt those policies necessary
to maintain economic competitiveness and so insure future economic
growth in the face of the socio-economic challenges of an aging
population, ever-growing globalization, and increased international
competition.
4. A further result of this structure is that at the national level, bad
compromises are negotiated that require the Flemish people to
make “[e]xorbitant and inefficient” financial transfers10 amounting to
over ten billion euros per year (about 1,734 euros for each Flemish

3. In one small area of Belgium, the East Canton region obtained from Germany after World War
I, German is the principal language of about 70,000 Belgians.
4. Belgian French is standard French, not a separate language, although there are some variations
in vocabulary.
5. The official language spoken in Flanders is now standard Dutch, not a separate Flemish dialect,
although several local dialects still exist. See KENNETH D. MCRAE, 2 CONFLICT AND COMPROMISE IN
MULTILINGUAL SOCIETIES 56–59 (1986).
6. Id. at 17.
7. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” MANIFESTO FOR AN INDEPENDENT FLANDERS
WITHIN EUROPE (2005).
8. Id. at 35–100. See also generally Stefaan De Rynck & Karolien Dezeure, Policy Convergence
and Divergence in Belgium: Education and Health Care, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1018 (2006).
9. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 101–06.
10. Id. at 132.
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person) to Wallonia and Brussels.11 If Flanders remains part of
Belgium, these subsidies are likely only to increase.12
5. The only durable solution is the full independence of Flanders.
Flanders is ready for independence because, by reason of its
economic and social development since World War II, it has the
identity and self-sufficiency necessary to be a full-fledged national
community, with all the characteristics of an independent member
state of Europe.13
The manifesto is neither shrill nor highly rhetorical. Instead, it has the
dispassionate, analytic tone and impressive graphics of a report that might have
been prepared by McKinsey and Company. Nor was it created and endorsed by
persons thought to be extreme Flemish nationalists, such as the leaders of the
Vlaams Belang. Instead, this manifesto was created and endorsed by people
who can best be described as Flemish members of the business and academic
establishments.14 The group was chaired by Remi Vermeiren, retired CEO of
KBC Group Banking Corporation, and included Herman de Bode, the
Chairman of McKinsey and Company in the Benelux and President of the
Harvard Club of Belgium. The manifesto provoked an immediate outcry from
the francophone community and was condemned by the francophone political
parties and press. Because of a francophone client’s protest, de Bode was forced
to resign as chair of McKinsey.15
Belgium represents a remarkable example of an enduring ethnic conflict
without any mass violence for over half a century. During the last thirty years a
political elite within Belgium negotiated a series of compromises that stitched
together a complex federal system that has held the country together.16 As a
result, Belgium has constitutionally evolved from a highly centralized national
state to one in which the French- and Dutch-language communities and the
Walloon and Flemish regions have gained a considerable amount of autonomy.
Today the long-standing language cleavage between the Flemish and the
Francophones has been embedded into a federal structure of mind-boggling
complexity that both reflects and reinforces the organization of political, social,
and cultural life on the basis of language. The good news is that there has been

11. Id. at 155.
12. See id. at 132–77.
13. Id. at 19.
14. The report was “drawn up by” the “Reflection Group” of sixteen Flemish businessmen and
academics who had studied Belgium’s problems at the “Warande,” the elite Flemish club in Brussels
located next to the residence of the American Ambassador to Belgium. So it is not a report “of” the
Warande. The Manifesto also carries the names of an additional fifty people who “subscribe[d] to [its]
conclusions . . . and principles.” Id. at 3, 17–18.
15. Luc Van Braekel, McKinsey CEO Calls for End of Belgium, Resigns, BRUSSELS JOURNAL,
Dec. 13, 2005, http://www.brusselsjournal.com/node/565/print.
16. See Liesbet Hooghe, Belgium: Hollowing the Center, in FEDERALISM AND TERRITORIAL
CLEAVAGES 62–66 (Ugo M. Amoretti & Nancy Bermeo eds., 2004) (noting that decentralization
negatively correlates with frequency of violent protests).
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practically no bloodshed.17 Whether or not Belgium survives as a single state,
there will certainly be no civil war, and history suggests that violence is
exceedingly unlikely.18 The bad news, as demonstrated by the political crisis
following the 2007 federal elections, is that these state reforms brought no
stability.
Belgium’s internal conflict poses broader questions relating to the resolution
of ethnic conflict. One question relates to violence: Why do some internal
ethnic cleavages with territorial dimensions lead to violent breakups (for
example, in Yugoslavia), while others are resolved peacefully (for example, in
Czechoslovakia)? Obviously, this question has no single answer, but the study
of Belgium can suggest some useful hypotheses and inform speculation.
The second question relates to federalism: To what extent can a nation with
ethnic cleavages be created or held together through institutional design? Here
the study of Belgium leads us to more-pessimistic conclusions. Federal
structures allowing for decentralized decision-making may exacerbate
centrifugal forces and hasten the eventual breakup of the nation. If this is so,
what role can federal structures play in other countries with ethnic cleavages
that have territorial dimensions where there is a history of violence? Iraq and
the Congo come to mind.
This article is organized as follows: Because the present conflict can be
understood only in historical context, section II uses a marriage metaphor to
introduce a brief history of Belgium. Section III describes Belgium today and
the current tensions between the Francophones and the Flemish. It lays out the
remarkably complex structure of Belgium’s present-day political institutions as
the politically negotiated responses to a set of persistent problems. Section IV
looks to the future: we speculate about whether there is sufficient “glue” to
hold Belgium together and describe the range of possible outcomes. In section
V, we offer some preliminary thoughts about the lessons from the Belgian
experience.
II
BACKGROUND
A. The Metaphor
Although the linguistic frontier is centuries old, the Belgian state is of much
more-recent origin. Belgium became a nation only in 1830, and its creation was
17. See id. at 62–64.
18. The closest the country ever came to widespread violent strife was in 1951. The conflict
concerned the “royal question”—whether King Leopold III, who was thought to have collaborated
with the Nazis, should retain the throne. There was a general strike in which a few protesters were
killed. Because it appeared the country might be on the brink of civil war, a compromise was
engineered in which Leopold III abdicated in favor of his son. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 111–12. See
generally JAN VELAERS & HERMAN VAN GOETHEM, LEOPOLD III: DE KONING, HET LAND, DE
OORLOG (1994).
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not the culmination of a single people, with a shared sense of Belgian identity,
achieving nationhood. Instead, the new state was essentially the product of an
arranged marriage between spouses who had little in common, the result of a
nineteenth-century compromise among the Great Powers interested in creating
a neutral buffer. The Flemish and the Francophones have lived together
peacefully for a number of years, but today the spouses are leading increasingly
separate lives. We offer the following metaphor to encapsulate the history of
the relationship between the two groups, and to frame Belgium’s current
dilemmas.
A French-speaking woman from a sophisticated and prosperous bourgeois
family married a Dutch-speaking Flemish man from peasant stock with little
money. From the outset, there were tensions in the marriage. The wife’s family
has always believed she married beneath her station. Because her family had the
money, during the early years of the marriage the husband found himself quite
dependent on it. Language was a big problem. The wife insisted on speaking only
French and expected her husband and even his family to become fluent in French
if he and they were to succeed. She did not object to the husband’s using his
language with his peasant friends or out in the fields, but she disallowed its use in
the house or at formal social occasions.
During most of the marriage, the wife and her family dominated the marital
relationship, economically and socially. In the years following World War II,
however, the economic position of the wife’s family eroded substantially, while
the husband and his family prospered. As a result, their economic positions were
eventually reversed. Over time the husband became more insistent on using his
own language when it pleased him, and he now takes greater pride in his family’s
history and achievements. However, the psychological postures of the spouses
have not changed as radically as these external changes might suggest. The
husband still has vivid memories of past mistreatment, and tends to see himself as
the victimized underdog. He remains resentful of what he often sees as his wife’s
condescending attitude and continuing (and in his mind, undeserved) sense of
superiority.
In recent years, by mutual agreement, the spouses have come to lead separate
and largely independent lives, although their marital property remains
commingled. Today, they quarrel a great deal about money. The husband resents
the wife’s profligate spending habits, her continued dependence on his wealth,
and her unwillingness to work outside the home. They have sharply contrasting
political views and social attitudes: the wife is a socialist, and the husband is more
committed to markets. Although the spouses have always nominally shared the
same religion (both are Catholic), the husband’s family has always been more
observant. Still, despite so many conflicts in their marriage, there is no history of
violence or physical abuse.
Money has become a bone of contention. The husband has come to question
whether his wife’s extravagant spending habits will ever change, and he now
regularly asks himself whether divorce might not be a preferred alternative. He is
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especially concerned that her economic profligacy might soon lead to his
financial ruin. The wife refuses even to discuss divorce, claiming that their
marriage is indissoluble, and she insists that marital solidarity requires that he
continue to use his resources to maintain her lifestyle. The husband also knows
that were they ever to divorce, the negotiations would probably be acrimonious
and difficult, and the costs to the husband would be substantial. The family has
accumulated a great deal of debt, the marital property would have to be divided,
and the husband knows he would probably have some spousal support
obligations, at least during a transitional period. The husband is also concerned
about the reactions of their neighbors to a divorce.
What worries the husband most about a divorce relates to its impact on their
sophisticated and cosmopolitan, French-speaking, 16-year-old son, named
Brussels, who is also a big spender. The husband realizes his wife would
probably insist on having sole custody. While at times ambivalent about the son
and resentful of his aristocratic pretensions, the husband feels an emotional
attachment that would make it difficult for him to give up the child entirely. The
husband would prefer some form of joint custody and would even consider
emancipating the youngster, although he realizes that the son lacks the ability to
support himself. He has told himself, “If there were ever a custody fight, I'm not
so sure the child would elect to live with his mother, even though French is his
mother tongue. My son is a big spender, and he knows who really has the money
in this family.”
B. The Creation of Belgium
From the late sixteenth century until the French Revolution, the territory
that now makes up Belgium essentially consisted of an amalgam of provinces—
some Francophone and some Flemish—controlled first by the Spanish and later
by the Hapsburgs. For centuries, French was the language spoken in most of the
southern provinces, while in the Flemish provinces in the north, the people
spoke various Dutch-German dialects, except for a small bourgeois elite who
also spoke French.
As a result of the French Revolution, from 1797 until 1814, this territory was
absorbed and controlled by France.19 This generally benefited the Walloon
region both economically and politically but was resented by the Flemish who
felt linguistically and religiously constrained.20 After the fall of Napoleon in
1815, the Great Powers decided at the Vienna Congress to make what is now
Belgium part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, ruled by King William
I of the House of Orange.
Within the southern part of the United Kingdom of the Netherlands, a
strange coalition subsequently emerged whose members shared a deep
resentment of Dutch rule, but for very different reasons. The liberal bourgeoisie

19. See E.H. KOSSMANN, THE LOW COUNTRIES 1780–1940, at 72–81, 686–87 (1978).
20. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 14.
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and francophone aristocracy resented the use of the Dutch language and
“foreign control.” The Catholic Church, especially influential in Flanders,
resented and was suspicious of the Netherlands because it was seen as a
Protestant state. In 1830, shortly after the successful insurrection in Greece and
the July Revolution in France, this coalition of liberals and Catholics led a
revolt against Dutch rule, which spread to working classes in Brussels.
With little bloodshed, a volunteer “Belgian” army (led by officers from
France) forced the Dutch troops in Brussels to retreat after four days of
fighting. The Dutch were never able to regain control. Although France wanted
to reannex the Belgian provinces, Britain protested. A provisional government
of the Belgian provinces proclaimed independence on October 4, 1830. On
December 26, 1830, a London Conference of the Great Powers recognized the
independence of the Belgian people and the new state. In 1831, the Belgian
National Congress (dominated by the francophone bourgeoisie, consisting of
Walloons and the Flemish elite) wrote a liberal constitution21 and created a
unitary parliamentary state with a constitutional monarch. A German noble,
Leopold of Saxe Coburg Gotha, (who was, among other things, Queen
Victoria's uncle22) was invited to become the first King of the Belgians. The
Netherlands officially recognized Belgium’s independence only in 1839 when
the United Kingdom, Austria, France, Prussia, Russia, and the Netherlands
signed the Treaty of London that both recognized the independent Kingdom of
Belgium and (at the United Kingdom’s insistence) agreed to its neutrality. The
key point of this history is to suggest that before Belgium was created in 1830,
there was no shared sense of “Belgian” identity, no sense of a single people
seeking nationhood.23
C. Francophone Dominance
Although the Flemish always outnumbered the French-speakers,24
francophone Belgians dominated the new country politically, economically, and
culturally. French was the language spoken both by the Walloons and by

21. The Belgian Constitution was arguably the most liberal in Europe. It recognized fundamental
freedoms relating to speech, press, religion, education, assembly, and languages, and also included
provisions relating to the separation of powers.
22. Leopold was to have close family connections to the monarchies in both Great Britain and
France. Queen Victoria’s mother was Leopold’s sister. Leopold’s first wife was Princess Charlotte
Augusta, an heiress to the British throne as the only legitimate child of the British Prince Regent (later
King George IV). She died, however, in 1817. In 1832, Leopold married Louise-Marie d’Orléans,
daughter of King Louis-Philippe of France.
23. This is not to say that after the creation of Belgium, some historians did not attempt to
reconstruct a Belgian history demonstrating the prior existence of some sense of peoplehood. For a
discussion of the use of history to construct a Belgian identity, see generally Louis Vos, Reconstructions
of the Past in Belgium and Flanders, in SECESSION, HISTORY AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 179 (Bruno
Coppieters & Michel Huysseune eds., 2002).
24. There were 2.4 million Dutch-speakers and 1.8 million French-speakers in 1846. André Alen,
Nationalism–Federalism–Democracy: The Example of Belgium, in 5 REVUE EUROPÉENE DE DROIT
PUBLIC 41, 45 n.24 (1993) (citing E.H. KOSSMAN, DE LAGE LANDEN 1780–1940, at 118 (2d ed. 1971)).
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Flemish bourgeoisie. During the nineteenth century, the vote extended only to
wealthy property owners, nearly all of whom were francophone. The Belgian
National Congress was dominated by Walloons and the francophone Flemish
elite.
The constitution created a strong, centralized government modeled after
France. Although it contained words suggesting language liberty, the national
policy established through legislation made French Belgium’s “single official
language.”25 It was contemplated that through “a policy of assimilation through
legal and economic influence” French could be imposed in Flanders.26 Initially,
the Dutch language was suppressed in all public administration and in statesponsored education. French was the only language used in the national
government, in governmental administration, and in the courts.
From the outset, the Walloon region also dominated the new nation
economically. With large coal reserves, this region was among the earliest in
Europe to industrialize, and it experienced rapid economic growth during the
nineteenth century.27 Flanders, on the other hand, relied on subsistence
agriculture. It had no modern industry: its famed textile facilities had never
become fully mechanized and floundered in the nineteenth century. Crop
failures led to a famine and contributed to massive unemployment and severe
economic hardship.28 As a result, some Flemish emigrated abroad, while others
moved to the Walloon region to work in factories and integrated there.29
Within Belgium, there was rampant social and economic discrimination
against those who spoke Dutch. Francophone Belgians viewed the Flemish
majority who could not speak proper French as uneducated, backward
peasants, suitable to do manual labor but little else.30 Because upward social
mobility required knowledge of French, many Flemish learned French. Indeed,
until well into the twentieth century, any well-educated Belgian had to learn

25. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 22. McRae translates the article in the original constitution as
follows: “The use of the languages spoken in Belgium is optional (facultatif). It can be regulated only by
law, and only concerning official acts and judicial matters.” The Law of 19 September 1831 declared
French to be the only official language for the proclamation of Laws and Resolutions. See also ANDRÉ
ALEN & KOEN MUYLLE, 1 COMPENDIUM VAN HET BELGISCH STAATSRECHT § 266 (2008); Kris
Deschouwer, Kingdom of Belgium, in CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS, STRUCTURE, AND CHANGE IN
FEDERAL COUNTRIES 48, 49 (John Kincaid & G. Alan Taylor eds., 2005).
26. M. Camille Huysmanns, The Flemish Question, 9 J. ROYAL INST. INT’L AFF. 680, 680 (1930).
27. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63–64.
28. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 23–24.
29. See REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 64. This explains the large
number of Flemish-sounding family names in Wallonia. All Flemish immigrants “Frenchified” over one
generation.
30. See Luc Huyse, Political Conflict in Bicultural Belgium, in CONFLICT AND COEXISTENCE IN
BELGIUM 107, 109–10 (Arendt Lijphart ed., 1981).
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French, and some bourgeois Flemish even spoke French at home.31 Few
Walloons ever bothered to learn Dutch.32
D. The Evolution of Language Policy: The Flemish Movement
Needless to say, many Flemish resented their inability to use their own
language, even in their dealings with the government. Until the 1870s, all trials
in Belgium—criminal as well as civil—were conducted exclusively in French.33
Sometimes, scandalous miscarriages of justice resulted. The best known case,
which has become central to the Flemish narrative, involved the wrongful
conviction and execution of two Flemish defendants accused of murder.34 After
they had been guillotined, another person confessed to the crime, and a
subsequent investigation suggested that the defendants could not understand
French, that their attorney knew no Dutch, and that the francophone judge had
relied on a mistranslation of a conversation overheard by a jailer.35 The public
outcry eventually led to a change in the law in 1873, permitting both Dutch and
French to be used in criminal trials in Flanders. In the decade that followed,
laws were changed to permit Dutch to be used in administrative matters and in
secondary education.36
Between 1890 and 1920, contemporaneous with constitutional amendments
that extended suffrage to men who were not property owners,37 a “Flemish
Movement” emerged.38 A major focus of this movement related to language
rights. Under pressure from the Flemish movement, a bilingual regime of sorts
was established in Flanders. Laws were put on the books providing for greater
equality between the French and Dutch languages, at least in Flanders. The
1898 “Law of Equality” nominally recognized the validity of both languages in
official documents.39 A 1921 law contemplated that municipal officials might be
bilingual.40 Nevertheless, these written laws did not substantially change actual

31. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 39–40 (referring to a “domestic colonialism” and stating that
“[t]his socioeconomic dimension of the linguistic boundary within the Flemish region has incontestably
heightened linguistic tensions”).
32. This asymmetry persists. See Victor Ginsburgh & Shlomo Weber, La Dynamique Des Langues
En Belgique [The Dynamics of Languages in Belgium], 42 REGARDS ECONOMIQUES 1, 4 (2006).
33. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 266–67.
34. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 24–25.
35. Id.
36. Dutch was legally permitted for use in administrative matters in 1878 and in secondary
education in 1883. Alen, supra note 24, at 46 n.28 (citation omitted).
37. In 1893, the Belgian Constitution was amended to give non-property-owning men one vote,
while allowing multiple votes to those who did own property. A 1920 amendment created universal
male suffrage, by which all men had a single vote. Full suffrage was not extended to women until 1948.
38. There is a vast literature on the Flemish movement. See generally Theo Hermans, Louis Vos
and Lode Wils, THE FLEMISH MOVEMENT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY (1992); Huysmanns, supra
note 26; François Nielsen, The Flemish Movement in Belgium After World War II: A Dynamic Analysis,
45 AM. SOC. REV. 76 (1980).
39. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 266.
40. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150.
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practices. The Walloon region remained exclusively francophone, and the
Flemish areas were said to be bilingual; but even in Flanders, many government
officials spoke only French.41
With respect to education, the hope in the nineteenth century was that the
entire country would eventually become francophone. Although there were
Church-supported primary schools in Flanders where Dutch was used, statesupported schools were predominantly francophone. A 1914 law explicitly
recognized for the first time “the right” of children in elementary schools to be
educated in their mother tongue, but there were still very few Flemish, statesupported, municipal primary or secondary schools.42 Change with respect to
higher education also came slowly, as it was taught primarily in French during
all of the nineteenth and more than half of the twentieth century. During World
War I, the Germans occupied much of Flanders and allowed instruction at the
University of Gent in Dutch. Notwithstanding pressure from the Flemish
movement, the Belgian government waited until 1930—more than ten years
after the war had ended—to allow the full “Netherlandization” of the
University of Gent.43
A critical change with respect to language policies occurred in 1932 and
1935, when for purposes of governmental activities, two monolingual regions
were created on the basis of a territorial line dividing the country into two
parts.44 The use of language in administrative matters, primary and secondary
education, and judicial matters was to be based exclusively on location—not the
mother tongue of the individual citizen. In Flanders, Dutch became the only
official language, and in the Walloon region, the official language was
exclusively French. Brussels and certain border areas were said to be bilingual.
In other words, on the basis of a territorial principle, Belgium was divided into
two monolingual regions. With the exception of Brussels, the national language
policy essentially became one of dual monolingualism, based on the principle of
territorial location, not bilingualism, with language rights attaching to
individuals.45 Some commentators suggest that the latter alternative of making
the entire country officially bilingual probably would have satisfied the Flemish
movement at the time. But this alternative would have been politically
impossible because of the reluctance of Francophones to provide Flemish
language rights for those Flemish living in Wallonia, combined with the
unwillingness of francophone bureaucrats to learn Dutch.

41. See id. at 28.
42. Huysmanns, supra note 26, at 688.
43. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 28.
44. See id. at 150–51.
45. Alen describes the emergence of what he calls the “principle of territoriality” in linguistic
legislation in 1932 and 1935. Alen, supra note 24, at 49. The language frontier became firm and final
with the Language Act of 8 November 1962. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 271; MCRAE, supra
note 5, at 152–56.
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E. The Reversal of Economic Roles: Flemish Prosperity
For more than a century after the establishment of the Belgian nation, the
Walloons were economically dominant. Today, Flanders is much more
prosperous than the Walloon region. The relative wealth of the two regions has
been reversed for two reasons. First, because of the decline of the coal and steel
industries in Wallonia (which had been the region’s backbone), jobs were lost
and there was little foreign investment to create some alternative. In the
meantime, Flanders enjoyed a period of industrial modernization. The Flemish
port of Antwerp prospered, and new plants were built for thriving industries
such as car assembly and shipbuilding. Foreign investment poured into the
region.46
By the mid-1960s, the Flemish gross regional product per capita surpassed
that of Wallonia.47 Today, the Flemish region of the country is substantially
richer than the Walloon region. Now the per capita GDP of Flanders exceeds
that of Germany, France, and the United Kingdom,48 while that of the Walloon
region is similar to the level of the poorest regions in France and Italy.49 The
unemployment rates50 and the high-school drop-out rates51 in the Walloon
region are both twice those of Flanders.
F. The Changing Institutional Structure
Since 1970, contemporaneous with the economic rise of the Flemish region,
numerous constitutional revisions have transformed Belgium’s governmental
structure from a strong, unitary, national system into a federal structure of
mind-boggling complexity, in which substantial power has devolved to
monolingual, sub–national governmental units.
One scholar described this process of constitutional devolution, which came
about through a series of negotiations at the national parliamentary level, as a
“hollowing of the center, in which resources and competencies were bartered
away to maintain peace.”52
Today, Belgium’s constitution allocates power and responsibility to
governments for each of three language communities (French, Flemish, and

46. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 51–53.
47. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 57.
48. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD ECONOMIC SURVEYS 2005: BELGIUM 102
(2005), available at http://www2.vlaanderen.be/ned/sites/werk/documenten/euro_oecd_ec_sv.pdf. In
2003, Flanders’ per capita GDP was 116.9% of the EU-25 average, while the Walloon region’s was only
85%.
49. Ludo Beheydt, The Linguistic Situation in the New Belgium, in LANGUAGES IN CONTACT AND
CONFLICT: CONTRASTING EXPERIENCES IN THE NETHERLANDS AND BELGIUM 48, 53–54 (Sue
Wright & Helen Kelly eds., 1995).
50. ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 48, at 100.
51. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 38.
52. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 56.
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German)53 and for three territorially based regions (Wallonia, Flanders, and
Brussels Capital).54 The communities and regions have separate, directly
elected, parliamentary-style legislatures, a legislatively accountable executive
body,55 and broad and exclusive policy responsibility and authority in specified
areas.
The communities have authority for education and schools, for all language
policies, for cultural matters, including support of the arts, and for family and
youth policies, among other things. The regions have authority for what are said
to be the “territory-related issues.” These include a broad range of policies
relating to economic development, the environment, agriculture, housing, water
and energy, transport, and public works. The regions also have the authority to
enter into international treaties with respect to matters concerning these
regional competences. Although the regions have some taxing authority,
revenues are raised primarily at the national level. Nevertheless, through block
grants and other transfers, the expenditures of funds and the allocation of
resources have been substantially transferred down to the regional and
community level.56
The Belgian federation is not hierarchical: the subunits have exclusive
legislative and administrative powers within their areas of competence. The
federal government cannot impose uniform standards on the regions or
communities. All are on equal footing, subject to the constitution. This allows
and even stimulates independent and autonomous policymaking.57
As a result of these changes, political life in Belgium is now conducted along
linguistic lines. No longer does any major political party operate on both sides
of the linguistic frontier: because of internal conflicts relating to language and
cultural autonomy, all three major parties—the Christian Democrats, the
Liberals, and the Socialists—have now split into separate French-speaking and
53. The Flemish Community governs the Dutch-language area but is also competent for the
Flemish organizations (for example, schools, museums, and the orchestra) in the Brussels Capital
Region. The same goes for the French Community, which covers the French-language area, and the
French organizations in the Brussels Capital Region. DE BELGISCHE GRONDWET, LA CONSTITUTION
BELGE, DIE VERFASSUNG BELGIENS [Constitution] art. 127–28 (Belg.). The German-speaking
Community consists of the German-language area. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 253.
54. The Flemish Region comprises the Dutch-language area; the Walloon Region consists of the
French- and German-language areas; and the Brussels Capital Region includes the bilingual-language
area. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 254.
55. Flanders decided early on to combine the language-based “Flemish community” parliament
with the Flemish regional parliament. The result is that there are a total of six, rather than seven,
parliamentary-style elected legislatures, each of which has a government. See ALEN & MUYLLE, supra
note 25, §§ 257–59.
56. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 78–79. The latest reform in 2000 (Lambermont) transferred revenues
from the income tax and the value-added tax to regions and communities, using a formula that enables
the Francophones to pay for their community’s education deficit. See REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE
WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 110–12 (discussing “the Lambermont jungle” and the resulting transfer of
taxation authority to the regions).
57. Jan Beyers & Peter Bursens, The European Rescue of the Federal State: How Europeanization
Shapes the Belgian State, 29 W. EUR. POL. 1057, 1060 (2006).
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Flemish parties.58 In the national elections, citizens must vote in geographically
defined areas—choosing exclusively from party lists of their own language
group. A person who lives in Flanders must vote for a Dutch-speaking party.
Similarly, a person voting in the Walloon region must choose a French-speaking
party. With the limited exception of the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde area,59 these
six parties do not compete in the national parliamentary elections.60 Nor do
political parties compete across the language line in the community and
regional elections, except in the Brussels Capital Region.61
In the French-speaking areas, the French-speaking Socialist Party was the
largest party for many decades, with the French Liberal Party typically second,
although in the June 2007 elections the French-speaking Liberal Party for the
first time displaced the Socialist Party as the largest. The francophone Christian
Democrats typically run a somewhat distant third. In the Flemish areas, the
Flemish Christian Democratic Party has most often been the largest party,
although the Flemish Liberal party did better in the 1999 and 2003 national
elections. The 2007 national elections again brought the Christian Democrats to
the number-one position. The Flemish socialist party is typically smaller and
lost many seats in the 2007 election. A fourth major Flemish party, the Vlaams
Belang, is an extreme right wing Flemish nationalist (some say fascist) party
that calls for Flemish independence and restrictions on immigrants and
immigration. This party was even the largest in Flanders in the 2004 regional
elections and the second largest in the recent 2009 regional elections.62 All this
history suggests that ideologically, the socialist tradition is much stronger in the
Walloon region, while the Catholic party is much stronger in the Flemish
region.
At the national level, a variety of mechanisms ensure that neither the
Flemish nor the francophone parties, acting on their own, can impose decisions
on the other language group. A governing majority in Parliament always
requires a coalition government, and the Belgian constitution requires that the
cabinet have an equal number of ministers from each language group, apart
from the Prime Minister. This means that the coalitions necessarily cross

58. As early as the 1930s, the Catholic Christian Democratic party had divided into two linguistic
“wings”—one Flemish and one French-speaking—over the issue of Flemish cultural autonomy, and
later in 1967, the Christian Democrats formally split into two separate parties as a result of the conflict
surrounding the Catholic University of Leuven/Louvain. Similarly, in the 1960s and ’70s, as Walloon
economic conditions declined, Walloon nationalist parties sprouted up, with federalist–socialist
agendas, which threatened the larger Socialist Party and led to its division in the 1970s. The national
Liberal Party also broke up along Flemish and francophone lines in 1968. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 59–
61.
59. See infra IV.A.3.
60. Kris Deschouwer, Falling Apart Together: The Changing Nature of Belgian Consociationalism:
1961–2001, 37 ACTA POLITICA 68, 79 (2002).
61. Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 60.
62. There is also a French-speaking right-wing nationalist party (the FN), but it has only one
representative.
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language lines, and typically include at least four of the six major parties.63 In
what is known as the cordon sanitaire, the six major parties have agreed never
to include the Flemish nationalists (the Vlaams Belang) in the governing
coalition—not so much because of its persistent calls for Flemish independence
as because of the Vlaams Belang’s fascist antecedents and racist hostility to
immigrants. Each deputy in the national House of Representatives, elected for
four year terms by proportional representation from party lists in
geographically defined districts, is assigned to either the French group or the
Dutch group, depending on the language of the electoral district.64
Constitutional amendments and certain “special laws” require concurrent
majorities from each language group as well as a two-thirds overall majority.
Representatives also negotiate in the shadow of an “alarm bell procedure,”
which, although rarely invoked, carries with it the threat that the government
will fall. This procedure enables a seventy-five-percent majority of either
language group to suspend the enactment of proposed legislation expected to
adversely affect that language group. If invoked, the procedure requires that the
matter be referred to the government for further consideration and negotiation,
which must give motivated advice in thirty days.
III
BELGIUM TODAY: TWO PEOPLES IN A DIVIDED SOCIETY
Early in the twentieth century, King Albert I was told by a Walloon political
leader, “[Sire,] You reign over two peoples. In Belgium, there are Walloons and
Flemish; there are no Belgians.”65 This statement is an overstatement if it is
meant to suggest that a Belgian identity counts for nothing.66 Some attitudes are
held in common by those on both sides of the language divide, including a
pragmatic willingness to compromise and a skepticism of government. Flemish
and Walloons alike take pride in the restaurant scene in Belgium (which is said
to have more Michelin stars per capita than France) and share a love for
outstanding food and drink. Nevertheless, survey evidence suggests that for
most, their identity as Belgians is thin, at least in comparison to their local or
regional identity.67 No one knows the words of the national anthem, and

63. See LIESBET HOOGHE, A LEAP IN THE DARK: NATIONALIST CONFLICT AND FEDERAL
REFORM IN BELGIUM 6 (1991). Since 60% of the population is Flemish, the unstated presumption has
been that the prime minister will be Flemish—not since the 1970s has a Walloon had the top position.
64. Except for the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde district, which includes both the Brussels Capital
region and some surrounding suburbs, all of the electoral districts are monolingual.
65. Jules Destrée, LETTRE AU ROI SUR LA SÉPARATION DE LA WALLONIE DE LA FLANDRE
[LETTER TO THE KING ON THE SEPARATION OF WALLONIA AND FLANDERS], translated in Alen,
supra note 25, at 47.
66. See Wilfried Swenden & Maarten Theo Jans, “Will It Stay or Will It Go?” Federalism and the
Sustainability of Belgium, 29 W. EUR. POL. 877, 889 (2006) (suggesting that the younger Flemish are
more willing to identify with Belgium, possibly because they lack firsthand experience with linguistic
discrimination).
67. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 65.
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Belgium is one of least nationalistic countries in the world. One Belgian
political scientist, suggesting a state might be defined as a network of
communication,68 expressed pessimism about Belgium’s future: “In Belgium,
there is little communication. There are separate media, extreme social
segregation, separate political parties and more and more authority in separate
hands.”69
Belgians are quick to note the real cultural differences between the
Walloons and the Flemish. The conventional wisdom is that the Flemish are
more disciplined and harder working, like the Northern European, Germanic
cultures, while the Walloons take after the more fun-loving Latins in Southern
Europe.70 Some political and ideological differences are conspicuous: the
socialist tradition is stronger in the Walloon region, and the Flemish are more
committed to a market economy.71 Whereas nearly every Belgian is nominally
Catholic, the Flanders region has a higher proportion of observant Catholics
than the more secular Walloon region.72
What seems incontestable today is that within Belgium, the language
cleavage has been embedded into a governmental structure that reinforces the
sense that there are “two peoples” who are likely, in time, to drift farther apart
and not closer together. Ordinary citizens may participate in the political
process only among their own language group. There are no mass media—that
is, national newspapers, television stations, or radio stations—aimed at both the
French- and Dutch-speaking communities. The daily newspapers are exclusively
Dutch, French, or German.73 Television and radio stations have been separate in
Flanders and Wallonia since 1960,74 and each community has its own public
broadcasting organization regulated by its language community, not the
national government.75
The degree of residential and workplace segregation in the Flemish and
Walloon regions is stunning. Belgians could be described as “living separately

68. See generally KARL W. DEUTSCH, NATIONALISM AND SOCIAL COMMUNICATION: AN
INQUIRY INTO THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATIONALITY (1953) (presenting a theory of nationalism as
linked with and dependent on social communication).
69. Because of promises of confidentiality involved in this and other interviews referenced in this
article, Law and Contemporary Problems is unable to independently verify their content. These sources
are on file with the authors.
70. See RUDY AERNOUDT, VLAANDEREN WALLONIË, JE T’AIME, MOI NON PLUS 17–35 (2006).
71. See Marleen Brans, Christian De Visscher & Diederik Vancoppenolle, Administrative Reform
in Belgium: Maintenance or Modernisation?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 979, 992–95 (2006) (discussing the
evidence on cultural differences between Flanders and Wallonia regarding organizational reforms in
government).
72. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 65–71.
73. See id. at 249–51 (discussing the history of the press in Belgium).
74. Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 50; see also MCRAE, supra note 5, at 237–49 (discussing the
history of Belgian broadcasting).
75. Belgian newspapers, however, are self-regulated by a single association, the Federation of
Editors, BBC NEWS, COUNTRY PROFILE: BELGIUM, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/country_pro
files/999709.stm (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
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together.” Very few who reside or commute to work in Wallonia are Dutchspeaking or Flemish.76 And vice versa: Flemish businessmen in prosperous
southwest Flanders complain that because even unemployed Walloons are
unwilling to commute to Flanders, they often hire workers from neighboring
France.77 Within Brussels (where French is spoken in 85% of homes, Dutch in
between 10% and 20%78), there is a modest degree of residential integration.
The Brussels workplace tends to be more integrated because many Flemish
people who live in Flanders commute to Brussels for work.79
Although Belgium is a small country, Flemish and Walloons interact socially
surprisingly little. Millions of Belgians are unable to communicate because they
cannot speak each other’s language. The degree of linguistic segregation in the
schools—from the elementary level through the universities—is striking. At all
levels, the curriculum of any particular school is typically taught exclusively in
either French or Dutch. Though some families intentionally cross-enroll their
children so that they might better learn the other language, these are
exceptions.
Nor is there a shared national commitment to make Belgians bilingual.80
Elementary schools, beginning in the fourth grade, do offer a few hours per
week of instruction in the other language, but few Walloons ever learn to speak
Dutch with any degree of fluency. In the year 2000, researchers found that in
Wallonia, 17% knew Dutch in addition to French.81 Only 7% were trilingual.82
The proportion of multilingual Flemish people was much higher: 57% knew
French and Dutch, and 40% knew English as well.83 Compared to a generation
ago, it is our impression that fewer Flemish speak French fluently now,
probably because of the increasing dominance of English.
IV
WHITHER BELGIUM?
The language cleavage is now embedded in and reinforced by Belgian’s
federal structure. Does the current structure represent a stable equilibrium, or
have these changes instead set into motion centrifugal forces that are likely to
76. The vast majority (about 90%) of all commuting is toward Brussels. Commuting between
Flanders and Wallonia is very limited (about 1% of all commuting). REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE
WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63.
77. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
78. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 57; Deschouwer, supra note 25, at 51.
79. See REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 63; MCRAE, supra note 5, at 76–
77.
80. Early in March 2007, the francophone socialist leader Elio di Rupo argued in favor of creating
bilingual schools in Brussels and surroundings. This measure was opposed by the Flemish Minister of
Education. See Frans De Smet, Di Rupo wil tweetalige scholen langs taalgrens, HET NIEUWSBLAD, Mar.
11, 2007, http://www.nieuwsblad.be/Article/Detail.aspx?articleID=do19fctr.
81. Ginsburgh & Weber, supra note 32, at 4.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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lead to further devolution and possibly state separation? What are the divisive
issues that might destabilize the present equilibrium? In Belgium, ethnic
federalism has enabled the regions to develop a full range of separate
governmental institutions that would seem to lower the costs of Flemish
secession. What “glue” is there to hold the country together, particularly in the
face of a serious economic or political shock?
A. The Issues
Belgium’s present-day federal structure can best be understood as a
complex set of compromises that was the product of a series of protracted
political negotiations that sought to deal with four problems, none of which has
been completely put to rest.
1. Language and the Quest for Autonomy
The Flemish movement was originally concerned primarily with language
rights and cultural equality. Francophone social dominance is at the origin of
the conflict.84 The combination of Flemish pressure, on the one hand, and
francophone resistance to a bilingual regime that would require Frenchspeaking government officials to learn Dutch, on the other, resulted in a scheme
of territorial monolingualism that was established in the 1930s. Over time,
however, the concerns of the Flemish movement broadened: “[I]t became
gradually more nationalist and autonomist in response to the slow adaptation of
the Belgian–francophone institutions and growing anti-Flemish sentiment
among French-speaking politicians.”85 In 1970, major constitutional reform was
brought by the joint request of the Flemish, who wanted cultural autonomy, and
the Walloons, who desired more autonomy for economic reform. It led to an
asymmetric federalism with communities (linked to language and culture) and
regions (linked to territory).86 The process did not stop there, and between the
1970s and today, the Flemish parties succeeded, through negotiations, in
creating a federal system that gives both sides the power to make policy for a
broad range of issues.87

84. DUTILLEUL, supra note 2, at 53 (quoting the journalist Guido Fonteyn).
85. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 59.
86. The fifth of five Flemish Resolutions of March 3, 1999, emphasizes the principle of language
territoriality, as well as a demand for supervision rights for the regions on appointments in several
federal institutions. See Op 3 maart 1999 worden er vijf resoluties i.v.m. de volgende staatshervorming
aangenomen, Mar. 3, 1999, available at http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/vp/informatie/informatheek/
informatiedossiers/vlaamsegrondwet/vijf_resoluties.htm.
87. This devolution involved a series of trades over time. The Walloons typically agreed to grant
more authority to the regions and communities only if the Flemish agreed to provide greater subsidies
for the Walloon region and francophone community. The 1993 Saint Michael Agreement and the 2000
Lambermont Agreement followed this pattern. See ELS WITTE, JAN CRAEYBECKX & ALAIN MENNEN,
POLITIEKE GESCHIEDENIS VAN BELGIË: VAN 1830 TOT HEDEN 447–53 (2005); REFLECTION GROUP
“IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 110–12.

13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC

168

LAW AND CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS

9/18/2009 11:05:58 AM

[Vol. 72:151

The conflict today relates to the Flemish pressure to go farther. Many within
Flanders want still greater autonomy and devolution to a confederal system,
and some (as the Manifesto suggests) seek Flemish independence. Francophone
Belgians object to further moves toward regional or communal autonomy. With
respect to language rights, the Flemish vehemently insist on the principle of
territoriality, while the Francophones (especially in the parts of Flanders
adjacent to Brussels) now suggest that language rights be attached to the person
of a citizen, entitling him to speak his own language in his dealings with
government. In the thirties, the reverse was true. The Francophones demanded
territorial monolingualism: French ought to be the exclusive language in the
South, and Dutch in the North.88 The Flemish now strongly oppose any
deviations from the territorial principle and do not accept any official language
other than Dutch on Flemish soil.89 This conflict between territoriality and
personality is at the heart of numerous debates between the two groups.90
2. Minority Protection vs. Majority Rule
Belgian democracy is not based on majority rule but instead provides an
example of a “consociational democracy,”91 in which proportional
representation, executive power sharing and grand coalitions, and minority
vetoes are key elements.92 At the national level in Belgium, in response to
Francophones’ fear that they might be outvoted and dominated politically by
the Flemish majority, Belgium has put in place a variety of institutional
mechanisms that prevent Flemish domination through majority rule. Because of
the alarm-bell procedure, the requirement of concurrent linguistic majorities for
special laws, equal representation in the national government, and a multiparty
political system that requires coalitions, the francophone political parties have
considerable leverage in the national Parliament to ensure that their interests
are taken into account in any negotiated deal.93

88. See MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150–51.
89. For a summary of the history of the language conflict from the Flemish perspective, see the
official site of the Flemish Government, http://www2.vlaanderen.be/taalwetgeving/eeuw_taalwetten
.html (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
90. See infra IV.A.3.
91. See Brendan O’Leary, Debating Consociational Politics: Normative and Explanatory
Arguments, in FROM POWER SHARING TO DEMOCRACY: POST-CONFLICT INSTITUTIONS IN
ETHNICALLY DIVIDED SOCIETIES 3, 26 (Sid Noel ed., 2005) (surveying “consociational thinking” and
suggesting that Belgium is an example of a state successfully managing its consociational difficulties);
see also Brendan O’Leary, An Iron Law of Nationalism and Federation: A (Neo-Diceyian) Theory of
the Necessity of Federal Staatsvolk and of Consociational Rescue, 7 NATIONS AND NATIONALISM 273,
288–91 (2001) (constructing a Herfindahl–Hirschman index to measure the number of politically
effective cultural groups in various countries, and noting a similarity between Belgium’s score and the
scores of other nations often described as having consociational institutions).
92. See generally Deschouwer, supra note 60; George Tsebelis, Elite Interaction and Constitution
Building in Consociational Democracies, 2 J. THEORETICAL POL. 5 (1990).
93. Kris Deschouwer, Consociational Democracy and Belgian Politics in the Twenty-First Century,
29 W. EUR. POL. 895, 906–07 (2006).
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In actual operation, the system’s consociational features and the complex
fragmentation of authority make coherent policy extremely difficult.94
Moreover, because the regions and communities lack general fiscal autonomy
and are dependent on federal grants and shared tax revenues, critical
negotiations occur at the national level, in a complex set of intergovernmental
mechanisms devoted to policy coordination.95 Many Flemish resent the
antimajoritarian elements as undemocratic and are frustrated by their inability
to develop coherent polices for their region. Yet the Flemish required the same
protective mechanisms in Brussels, where they are a minority. 96
3. Brussels
The Brussels metropolitan area presents a special problem for Belgium
because of its physical location, its history, and its growth. Brussels is physically
situated in Flanders, and in the mid-nineteenth century a majority of the city’s
inhabitants were Flemish.97 Today Brussels is no longer a Flemish city. In fact, it
has become overwhelmingly francophone.98 The negotiated compromise was to
make the nineteen municipalities of Brussels into a separate, bilingual Brussels
Capital Region that is not part of either Flanders or Wallonia, which are
monolingual. In order to protect the Flemish minority within Brussels from
francophone domination, the governmental structure of the Brussels Capital
Region has several antimajoritarian rules akin to those in the national
government structure.99 Flemish residents of Brussels are guaranteed the right
not only to use their language in administrative dealings with the government,
but also to have Dutch-speaking schools.
Brussels remains a point of political contention because metropolitan
Brussels extends well beyond the nineteen municipalities in the Brussels Capital
Region. Over the years, an increasing number of French speakers have acquired
homes in the surrounding areas.100 The Flemish fear and resent what they see as
the creeping “Frenchification” of these Flemish areas.101 In 1962, Dutch
speakers pushed for and secured legislation to establish a fixed linguistic border

94. For example, social insurance, including health insurance, is a federal matter, but public-health
policies are said to be a community competence. The communities govern education but the regions
control school transport, while the national government controls teachers’ pensions and sets standards
for professional qualifications. The main social-policy instruments relating to income redistribution
(social security, the welfare system, and the personal-income tax) remain with the federal government.
95. See Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 886–88.
96. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 347–49.
97. Alen, supra note 24, at 49.
98. As noted, within the Brussels capital region, 85% of the population is French-speaking and
only about 15% speak Flemish at home. Today, a substantial fraction of the population of Brussels is
made of immigrants, many from North Africa and Turkey. This population is largely francophone.
Brussels is becoming more and more a multilingual city where languages such as English and Arabic
are of increasing importance.
99. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 73–76.
100. See the official website of the Flemish Government, supra note 89.
101. Hooghe, supra note 16, at 60–61.
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around Brussels.102 But as part of a political compromise, some of the suburban
municipalities that are not part of Brussels proper have received linguistic
“facilities.” These facilities entitle Francophones living in these particular
Flemish municipalities to deal with the municipal authorities in French.103 From
the Flemish perspective, this compromise was seen at the time as a temporary
violation of the territorial principle, to enable those francophone citizens to
integrate and learn Dutch.104 From the Francophone’s perspective, this fortyfive-year-old exception to the territorial principle is now seen to suggest that
language rights should adhere to the individual and therefore should be a
permanent and personal privilege. The conflicting perspectives came to a head
in November 2007, when the Flemish Minister of Internal Affairs refused to
appoint and recognize three francophone mayors in these particular
municipalities located within the Flemish region because of their refusal to
comply with Dutch-language regulations. For the same reason the Minister also
annulled several resolutions of municipal council meetings conducted in French.
A related flash point concerns the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral and
judicial district, a single district that includes both the officially bilingual
Brussels Capital Region core as well as the nominally monolingual Dutch area,
Halle–Vilvoorde, which surrounds it. The Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral
district was created as another part of the 1962 political compromise. The net
effect of having this electoral district, which is larger than Brussels itself, is that
in national elections francophone residents in Halle or Vilvoorde can vote for
francophone parties from the Brussels Capital Region and for candidates who
live in Brussels proper and do not reside in the Halle or Vilvoorde areas. It also
assures the Francophones in that area access to francophone courts. The crisis
arose as the result of two rulings of the Belgian Constitutional Court that
having Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde as a single electoral district was inconsistent
with provisions of the Belgium Constitution that contemplate territorially based
electoral districts.105 The Flemish parties insist that the borders of the Brussels
Capital Region remain fixed and that the electoral district be split so that voters
in the Halle–Vilvoorde areas are no longer attached to the Capital Region for
any voting purposes.106 The francophone parties oppose the split, and ask that

102. MCRAE, supra note 5, at 150–152.
103. Id. at 155.
104. See the official website of the Flemish Government, supra note 89.
105. Grondwettelijk Hof van België, Cour Constitutionnelle de Belgique, Verfassungsgerichtshof
Belgien, Feb. 26, 2003, No. 30/2003; Grondwettelijk Hof van België, Cour Constitutionnelle de
Belgique, Verfassungsgerichtshof Belgien, May 26, 2003, No. 73/2003; see also ALEN & MUYLLE, supra
note 25, § 225.
106. See Persbericht: Unanimiteit op staten-generaal, SPLITS BRUSSEL–HALLE–VILVOORDE, May
20, 2005, http://www.splits-bhv.be/startpagina.htm.
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six communes with a number of francophone residents be given permanent
language facilities and even be added to Brussels proper.107
This conflict will likely be resolved eventually with some sort of “Belgian
compromise.” Its practical importance is minor—with respect to national
electoral power, little turns on how the Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde electoral
district is reformed. Nevertheless, the conflict has substantial symbolic
importance on both sides of the language divide and is used for purposes of
political mobilization.
4. Regional Economic Differences, Internal Transfers, and Entitlement
Policies
A far more important and potentially explosive conflict relates to the
control and allocation of governmental resources and to Flemish pressures for
further devolution. In Belgium today, revenues for all levels of government are
generated primarily by taxes levied at the national level.108 Because Flanders is
now much richer than Wallonia, it pays proportionately more of these taxes.109
In various past negotiations at the national level, the leaders of the francophone
parties have exercised their leverage to extract and protect what the Flemish
parties see as disproportionate internal transfers from the Flemish region to the
Walloon region and Brussels. A good portion of these transfers occur because
unemployment insurance, health insurance, and social security (old-age
retirement benefits, disability) remain national and not regional programs.
Flemish (who on average have higher incomes) pay more into these programs
than they receive.110
There are now regular calls from the major Flemish political parties for the
regionalization of some of these national entitlement programs. Flemish
business leaders are deeply concerned that these programs will destroy
Flanders’ ability to compete in a global marketplace in the long run and that
only regionalization will provide safeguards against even greater burdens in the
years to come.111
Many Flemish feel that Flanders is presently tied to an economic region that
refuses to cooperate in its own rescue, and that the Walloon region risks
drowning Flanders as well. Moreover, the average Flemish person on the street

107. See “Bruxelles–Halle–Vilvoorde,” un épineux sujet de discord [“Brussels–Halle–Vilvoorde,” A
Thorny Subject of Discord], JOURNAL DES FINANCES (Fr.), Jan. 26, 2008, http://www.jdf.com/dossier/
2008/01/26/04007-20080126ARTHBD00406-bruxelles-halle-vilvorde-un-epineux-sujet-de-discorde.php.
108. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 502–06.
109. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 146–51.
110. For precise numbers, see Bea Cantillon et al., Social Redistribution in a Federalised Belgium, 29
W. EUR. POL. 1034, 1040–43 (2006).
111. In 1999 the Flemish Parliament passed resolutions calling for tax autonomy and for broader
and more-coherent or homogeneous authority in areas such as employment policy, health care,
children’s allowances, collective labor agreements, railways, traffic regulation, and some aspects of
penal-law enforcement. See Resolutions of March 3, 1999, available at http://www.vlaamsparlement.be/
vp/informatie/informatheek/informatiedossiers/vlaamsegrondwet/vijf_resoluties.htm.
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resents the idea of substantial subsidies from Flanders to the Walloon region.112
Others within Flanders, while not hostile to the principle of national solidarity,
object to the implementation of the existing welfare system, the lack of
transparency, and the absence of objective criteria.113
Many in Flanders also object that the regions lack the policy instruments to
create efficient economic policies. For example, the Flemish Economic Minister
lacks the power to grant abatements to the company tax (which is levied at the
national level) but instead must use subsidies and direct grants to attract new
industry.114 Regionalization of these policies is vehemently opposed by the
francophone parties, especially the socialist party, which sees these national
entitlements as vitally important to its political base and at the core of the
party’s political ideology.115 In sum, these issues are deeply divisive and could
generate a substantial degree of mass political mobilization on both sides of the
language divide.
B. What Glue?
In light of these and other conflicts between the Flemish and the Walloons,
what can hold Belgium together, particularly given the centrifugal pressures
generated by the existing federal regime? One frequently hears, only half in
jest, that the only truly Belgian institutions are the soccer team and the
monarchy. But neither provides much glue.116 Belgium soccer teams have had
limited success in international competitions, and hardly provide a source for
much national pride.
The royal family is plainly committed to holding the country together, and
King Albert II is well liked among both francophone and Dutch-speaking
Belgians. If he were to die now, many on both sides of the linguistic divide
would grieve and fly a Belgian flag at half-mast. But Flemish regularly complain
that the royal family has always preferred to speak French and has never
bothered to develop a deep mastery of the Dutch language nor exhibited much
interest in its culture. The heir apparent, Prince Philippe, is regularly ridiculed
in the Flemish press as a none-too-bright, awkward bumbler. Some Belgians,
though, who have had personal and professional dealings with the Prince
consider him a well-meaning and conscientious man, but one better suited for
the monarchy in a different age—a person entirely lacking the modern
communicative and political skills to unite a divided society.117 One Flemish

112. Professor Giuseppe Pagano has called the combination of “profound cultural resentment” and
expensive transfers an “explosive cocktail.” DUTILLEUL, supra note 2, at 167.
113. AERNOUDT, supra note 70, at 175.
114. Id. at 206–12.
115. For an argument that regionalization is inconsistent with the provision of social services, see
the official website of the francophone socialist party, http://www.ps.be (last visited Apr. 2, 2009).
116. The monarchy provides a strong glue, however, not in itself, but as an important mechanism in
the creation and continuation of a strong Belgian establishment. See infra IV.B.3.
117. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
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political leader summed up her faith in the monarchy this way: “The perfect
Belgian King would have movie star looks, be completely fluent in many
languages, would be charming, would not be a womanizer or be sexually
aberrant in any way. How likely are you to get such a person by birth and
primogeniture?”118
One might suppose that a 175-year-old shared history would bind the
country together. But much of this shared history has not been happy. Although
today the Flemish region is more prosperous and has considerable autonomy,
many Flemish still resent language slights and perceived ongoing francophone
condescension. Two devastating world wars were fought on Belgian soil, and
during each was a German occupation that led to divisive and bitter postwar
accusations in which many Flemish felt unfairly accused of collaboration.
According to one prominent Flemish businessman, “After World War II,
Walloons accused many Flemish of collaboration. While only a few were ever
prosecuted, many Flemish felt misunderstood and unfairly tarred. The scars
from this condemnation still exist in many Flemish families.”119 Some in the
francophone community are very quick to characterize Flemish politics today as
reflecting fascistic roots that existed before World War II. They see this in the
electoral strength of the Vlaams Belang, and they regularly condemn the
Flemish as selfish and lacking in feelings of social solidarity because of their
express desire to reduce the entitlements of the welfare state.
The factors that are most likely to hold the country together are (1) Flemish
fears that Brussels might be lost, (2) a national culture that accepts pragmatic
compromise and dislikes violence, (3) a strong Belgian establishment including
a national-political-party elite with experience at problem-solving negotiations,
and (4) European integration and the European Union.
1. Brussels
Today Brussels is not only the capital of Belgium and often characterized as
the capital of Europe—it is the capital of the Flemish regional government and
community. For those Flemish pressing for Flemish independence, Brussels
presents a real political stumbling block. Although Brussels is located within
what was historically a Flemish-speaking area, it is highly unlikely that a
majority of this overwhelmingly francophone city, if given a choice, would elect
to dissolve Belgium to become part of Flanders. Nor would Brussels’ residents
likely prefer to become part of a new francophone nation over the status quo.
Francophone residents of Brussels do not identify with the Walloon region or
its separate culture so much as with the more cosmopolitan, broader French
culture. Residents of Brussels might also prefer the status quo to dissolution for
economic reasons: Brussels is not a rich city, and today it benefits from transfers
from Flanders—both direct and indirect.120
118. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
119. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
120. REFLECTION GROUP “IN DE WARANDE,” supra note 7, at 132–55.
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Without describing the process by which it might be achieved, the Manifesto
suggests that after dissolution of Belgium, Brussels should become a shared
responsibility of the two new nations as well as the EU, a condominium of
sorts.121 In the Manifesto authors’ view Brussels might become a “free city,” that
is, part of neither new country, but instead the capital of Europe, supported and
subsidized by the EU.122 Although such alternatives would presumably be
acceptable to many in Flanders who prefer independence, a Flemish state bent
on securing its independence could not unilaterally impose such arrangements.
Instead, they would have to be created through negotiations that would require
the agreement of the national francophone parties and the EU and perhaps
some sort of ratification by the residents of Brussels, as well. But why would the
francophone parties or the EU agree to such arrangements, which they would
surely see as paving the way to Flemish independence?
This raises an important question for the advocates of Flemish
independence: How likely is it that a majority of Flemish would support
independence if in the process Flanders risks “losing” Brussels in the sense that
it could not remain the capital of Flanders or be part of the new Flemish
nation? In answering this question, one must acknowledge that many Flemish
have ambivalent feelings toward Brussels. They often express pride in this
cosmopolitan city and its Flemish roots. But at the same time many Flemish—
especially those who live and work outside the city—feel Brussels has become a
foreign metropolis filled with immigrants. They often express resentment that
Brussels is only nominally bilingual, that in reality Dutch is not much used or
even understood in many shops and restaurants. Notwithstanding this
ambivalence, Brussels is an important part of the glue that holds the country
together. Like a father who never files for divorce because he is unwilling to
give up custody of a child, many Flemish—who might otherwise favor
independence—would, we suspect, prefer to stay in an unsatisfying Belgian
marriage in which the spouses lead separate lives rather than give up Brussels.
Many seem to corroborate this analysis. One important business leader
supporting the Manifesto confessed he would never favor divorce if it meant
giving up Brussels.123 Another agrees with the analysis of the Manifesto but does
not want dissolution, thinking of himself as a strong federalist.124 One political
leader put it quite clearly: “If you ask people in Brussels Central Station[,] ‘Do
you want Belgium to divide?,’ 75% of the Flemish would oppose. On the other
hand, if you ask ‘Should Flanders have more autonomy?,’ 75% of the Flemish
would say yes. The problem of Brussels can’t be solved. Brussels is becoming a

121. Id. at 197–207.
122. See id. at 201–12 (laying out a plan for reorganizing Brussels as a region separate from Flanders
and Wallonia, borrowing from the example of Washington, D.C.); TRENDS REDAKTIE, BRUSSEL,
WASHINGTON AAN DE ZENNE. EEN PLEIDOOI VOOR BRUSSEL ALS EUROPESE HOOFDSTAD 9 (1989)
(comparing Brussels to Washington, D.C.).
123. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
124. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
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less francophone and more polyglot community.”125 He also suggested that even
with divorce, the underlying problems of immigration, unemployment, socialsecurity costs, and the need for transfer programs would remain—just on a
smaller scale. Each region would still need governmental transfer programs.126
2. A Pragmatic and Pacifist Culture that Supports Compromise
Certain elements of a shared culture provide glue that might well hold the
country together. The experience in the two world wars appears to have
created—on both sides of the linguistic divide—a strong tendency toward
pacifism and conflict avoidance. One political leader commented,
Belgians are conflict averse. Given the history of the country, Belgians have no taste
for fighting or for wars. Our land has provided the site of battles fought by others, and
our people have been occupied by the French, the Dutch and the Germans. People in
this country don’t like the government, and don’t like the army. There is very little
chauvinism. While the ties with the nation are very thin and there is little state feeling
127
or identity, there is not taste for violence.

Fear of the unknown consequences of a divorce, combined with Belgium’s
current prosperity as a united nation, creates a bias towards the status quo even
among the Flemish. So long as Flanders remains prosperous—today it ranks
among the richest regions of the world—many Flemish who might abstractly
prefer greater Flemish autonomy are reluctant to upset the apple cart and break
up the Belgian state. Why risk today’s comfort for the possible benefits of
independence? On the other hand, in an ongoing, deep crisis like we are
experiencing today, Flemish economic insecurity, coupled with continued
resentment of subsidies to the Walloon region, might create a greater
willingness to take the risk.
An equally important factor that provides “glue” relates to a shared cultural
commitment throughout Belgium to pragmatism and compromise. Indeed, the
Belgians use the expression “a Belgian compromise” to describe a deal in which
difficult issues are resolved in a messy, inefficient, and ambiguous way—in
which both sides have made concessions but no one understands the long-term
implications. But these compromises allow ordinary life to go on without undue
disruption or violence. The history of Belgium in general, and especially the
history of its constitutional reforms since 1970, is replete with such
compromises.128
3. A Political Elite and National Establishment
Belgium’s entire federalist design, with its complicated consociational
mechanisms taking into account and recognizing the interests of both sides, is
an illustration of such compromise. Notwithstanding this regionalization, a

125.
126.
127.
128.

Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, §§ 247–349.
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federal political career remains highly attractive.129 The elites of the various
political parties have had a great deal of experience negotiating various
compromises across both language and ideological cleavages. In these
negotiations the leaders have a great deal of power because the leaders can
speak for their parties. Belgium is sometimes called a “partocracy” because
party discipline is absolute; in parliament, deputies vote as their party leaders
dictate because it is the leaders who substantially influence whether someone is
a candidate, as well as candidates’ positions on the electoral list.130
The need for coalitions to form a government, when combined with the
various antimajoritarian rules, creates a system in which there is pressure to
forge some sort of working consensus across party lines.131 Stalemates do occur,
and sometimes these cause the government to fall and new elections to be
called. But the typically protracted negotiations often lead to log-rolling
compromises, sometimes with further devolution of authority to the regional or
community level, combined with various side-payments subsidizing the Walloon
region. One political scientist declared,
The reforms of the 1970[]s in essence obligated the political elites to be prepared to
negotiate various compromises because the price of failure was that the government
would fall. This was a very high price. The elite are and have been very creative in
avoiding gridlock and negotiating intricate and creative compromises, typically behind
closed doors. They deal with each other all the time and know each other’s true
“bottom lines” or reservation points. People were not aware in the 1970[]s of how
substantial the implications of these changes would be. Not simply a first step to
132
“Federalism” but instead a procedural framework that required double majorities.

Complaints about Belgium’s “democratic deficit” relate in some measure to
the fact that these leaders, behind closed doors, can negotiate deals without
much public input or dialogue.133 Leaders are often accused of “selling out” and
accepting arrangements that are inconsistent with assurances given during
election campaigns. But over the years, this political elite—because of shared
cultural commitment across the language cleavage to the peaceful resolution of
conflict—has provided the glue that has helped hold the country together.134
The multilevel and very complex, asymmetrical governance system forces
party leaders to “conceptuali[z]e their role as the cement that binds the various

129. Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 891. This may also be explained by the increasing
importance of Europe, which has led to a strengthening of the position of the federal government. See
infra IV.B.4.
130. STEFAAN FIERS, PARTIJVOORZITTERS IN BELGIË OF “LE PARTI, C’EST MOI”? 106 (1998);
Lieven De Winter & Patrick Dumont, Do Belgian Parties Undermine the Democratic Chain of
Delegation?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 957, 964–69 (2006).
131. Deschouwer, supra note 93, at 901–04.
132. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
133. On this lack of legitimacy and procedural justice, see Tom Tyler, Governing Pluralistic
Societies, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 187 (Spring 2009).
134. See Jaak Billiet, Bart Maddens & André-Paul Frognier, Differences in Political Culture Between
Flemings and Walloons, 29 W. EUR. POL. 912, 930–31 (2006) (“[A]n over-arching Belgian political and
economic elite still exists, which uses its . . . power to maintain the unity of the country.”).
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elements of the system together.”135 According to some observers, party leaders
have maintained their dominant position by using the state for their own ends,136
while the state itself has used these leaders to provide cohesion to the governing
process. Corruption and “clientelism” are seen as indispensable for the
maintenance and continuation of the system.137
The Belgian establishment glue extends beyond the political class. Many
have a stake in the survival of Belgium as a country: business, economic, and
financial leaders; federal civil servants and diplomats; the heads of employers’
organizations and trade unions. The trade unions and mutual health funds
provide for various social services and, most important, are responsible for the
administration of unemployment and health benefits. Billions of euros run
through their hands, all from national social-security programs under the
control of the federal government. Moreover, during the last twenty years the
King has systematically worked to broaden this Belgian power base by creating
a large number of new knights and barons. Many among the Flemish business
and academic elites are thus co-opted into the national Belgian establishment.138
4. Europe
It is not a simple matter to assess whether on balance European integration
operates to weaken the national state and strengthen the regions within
Belgium, or vice versa. On the one hand, some governmental functions are now
at the supranational level. Furthermore, there are some EU policies that relate
directly to the regions and bypass the national government. The Treaty of the
European Union allows regional Ministers to be actively present in meetings of
the European Council. These realities can be seen as strengthening the regions
at the expense of the national state. But the rules of the European Council
require that a nation’s regional representatives in the Council act in unity, and
take a single position for the national state as a whole, irrespective of the
underlying constitutional status of the region in that member state.139 Therefore,
in some respects the EU forces regions or other subunits of a state to cooperate.
Numerous cooperative modes of governance have been developed for that
purpose.140
Therefore, although European integration has given subentities in several
areas a strong role and powers, it has enabled the federal government to
strengthen its position as a key policymaking player and to occupy a powerful
gate-keeping position between the domestic regional level and Europe. Even in
135. B. Guy Peters, Consociationalism, Corruption and Chocolate: Belgian Exceptionalism, 29 W.
EUR. POL. 1079, 1081 (2006).
136. It is therefore not so surprising that in Belgium the splitting up of national political parties into
regional parties has preceded the regionalization of the country. See Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at
880.
137. Peters, supra note 135, at 1086–87.
138. See JOOST BALLEGEER, DE VLAMINGEN: EEN VOLK ZONDER BOVENLAAG 194 (2005).
139. See Beyers & Bursens, supra note 57, at 1064.
140. For many concrete examples, see id. at 1062–73.
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policy areas in which Europe has made the regions potentially dominant, such
as the environment and agriculture, the regions have been forced to cooperate
in order to present a single Belgian position to the EU.141
C. The Current Crisis and Alternative Scenarios for the Years Ahead
The aftermath of the June 2007 federal elections in Belgium brought to
international attention the profound cleavage existing within contemporary
Belgium. Over a period of more than six months, all attempts to form a new
government failed because of the inability to put together the necessary
coalition of Flemish and francophone parties to create a governing majority.
The hang-up was disagreement on an agenda for state reform. In desperation,
just before Christmas 2007, a deal to form a temporary, interim government was
brokered.
Only in March 2008 was a permanent government formed. In October 2008
a “dialogue” among regional representatives began relating to further “reform”
of the governmental structure. With the economic crisis in November 2008, it
was “temporarily” suspended. Shortly before Christmas 2008, the Prime
Minister was forced to resign because of claims of inappropriate interference
with a judicial proceeding relating to the banking crisis. A successor was
appointed on December 30, 2008. The June 2009 regional elections have more
or less confirmed the existing power balance. In sum, more than two years after
the 2007 national elections, nothing has changed in terms of the basic structure.
In the long run, what are the conceptual possibilities concerning the future
of Belgium? We see four options.
1. The national government might be strengthened and policies
adopted to mitigate the language-based cleavage and to strengthen
Belgian national identity.
2. The status quo might be maintained with no significant change in
governmental structure.
3. There might be further devolution of authority to the regions,
perhaps leading in the long run to a confederation.
4. The Flemish might establish an independent state.
The first outcome is rather unlikely given the existing governmental
structures and the concomitant interests of various political stakeholders. In
theory, the engine of history might be “run in reverse,” and Belgium might
adopt policies to make the entire country bilingual, strengthen the Belgian
national identity, and augment the powers of the national government.
However, because the separate language communities control the schools and
language policy, the national government lacks the authority to require
bilingual education. It will also be particularly difficult to get the regional
groups to give up powers they currently have. Path dependency often means

141. Id. at 1073.
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that steps, once taken, cannot be retraced. The present attitude—especially in
Flanders with its desire to do things its own way (what we do ourselves, we do
better)—and the limited interaction between the regional governments, makes
this option rather unrealistic. The lack of interaction also restricts the
opportunities for the governments to learn from each other. Research even
suggests that many of the negative consequences of the present federal system
are simply due to the different political cultures and have little to do with the
state structure.142 Although the current crisis might reignite Belgian unity and
state reform might push some competencies down from the federal level while
re-federalizing others, it seems unlikely that Belgium will ever once again
become a unitary national state.
The second outcome, maintaining the structural status quo, would surely be
preferred by many in the Walloon region. During the six months following the
June 2007 elections, it appeared that some francophone politicians might
succeed in avoiding even discussion of further reform. They did not completely
succeed. There has been some “dialogue.” But for the most part francophone
political leaders continue to resist substantial changes to the status quo.
The third scenario, further devolution, is the most plausible. The aftermath
of the 2007 national and the 2009 regional elections, and the perceived risk that
a prolonged stalemate might jeopardize the future of the Belgian state, might
someday lead to some sort of Belgian compromise—a compromise in which the
francophone political elite will eventually, reluctantly accept some additional
devolution as necessary in order to save the country. The Flemish elite will get
far less devolution than they desire but will have succeeded in adding to their
regional power.
Before the 2007 federal elections, all three mainstream Flemish-language
parties had indicated they would prefer further devolution of authority to the
regions, particularly with respect to economic and social-welfare policies. The
Flemish Socialist party preferred modest changes in the existing federal system
and strongly advocated regionalizing employment policies. The Flemish
Christian Democratic Party has suggested it would go much further and would
prefer a “confederal” state.143 Such an outcome would require an amended or
new constitution in which the regions would cede to the national government
only defined and limited powers, perhaps relating primarily to national defense
and some aspects of foreign affairs. All of the francophone parties oppose any
further devolution, and vehemently object to the notions of a confederation or
Flemish independence. But the political crisis since the 2007 elections has
forced the Francophones to change their attitude toward any change from a
firm “No” into a reluctant “Maybe,” at least if the changes are modest.

142. See generally Jeroen Maesschalck & Steven Van de Walle, Policy Failure and Corruption in
Belgium: Is Federalism to Blame?, 29 W. EUR. POL. 999 (2006).
143. Some Francophones describe confederalism as “le fédéralisme des cons [the federalism of
idiots].” See DUTILLEUL, supra note 2, at 42, 161–62.
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A fourth outcome, which still looks very unlikely, would be Flemish
independence. Presently only the Vlaams Belang and one small conservative
Flemish party (the N-VA) advocate the creation of an independent Flemish
state. This might result from either the negotiated dissolution of the Belgian
state or the successful unilateral secession by Flanders. Assessing the likelihood
of each possible outcome requires an analysis of a complicated Belgian
bargaining game.
Someday the political situation within Belgium might come to resemble a
game of chicken. In that dangerous game two teenagers drive towards each
other at high speed down a single lane. The teenager who swerves to avoid a
crash is the chicken; the teenager who stays in the lane wins the game. If neither
swerves, they crash and obviously both lose. Each player would like to win; but
each player would prefer to swerve than to crash.
In these negotiations the Flemish parties argue for further devolution; the
francophone parties resist. The Flemish political elite at the national level claim
that francophone intransigence may risk eventual Flemish secession. Given the
problem of Brussels and the various legal impediments to secession, the
francophone parties do not consider the threat of secession credible. Indeed,
they may believe that in the end the leaders of the mainstream Flemish political
parties would not support Flemish secession because independence might not
serve their personal political interests.
A stalemate might well lead to escalation on the part of the more
mainstream Flemish parties to put greater pressure on the francophone parties.
In the face of francophone intransigence, more Flemish politicians may come to
favor independence, unless there is further devolution. Someday members of
the Flemish parliament might signal that a majority would support secession if
the francophone parties remain intransigent. Resolutions might be proposed in
the Flemish Parliament advocating an advisory referendum to the electorate
within Flanders on the question of Flemish independence.
In this bargaining game the Flemish parties are at a real disadvantage.
Whether a majority in Flanders would come to favor independence, especially
in light of the problem of Brussels, is hardly clear. More fundamentally, a
unilateral declaration of independence by the Flemish parliament is of dubious
legality. These impediments would be substantial, within Belgium, within the
EU, and for the international community.
Nothing in the Belgian constitution allows secession. The constitution could
not be amended to allow it without the support of the francophone parties. If
the Flemish parliament proposed holding a referendum in Flanders as a prelude
to a unilateral declaration of independence, those opposed to Flemish
independence would no doubt bring a lawsuit in the Belgian Constitutional
Court, which has jurisdiction to resolve all conflicts relating to the allocation of
authority between the various levels of the federal system. In this court, a
complainant would likely point to Article 143 § 1 of the Constitution, which
announces the principle of federal loyalty and implies that the regions and

13_MNOOKIN-VERBEKE_FINAL.DOC

Spring 2009]

THE FLEMISH AND WALLOONS IN BELGIUM

9/18/2009 11:05:58 AM

181

communities have an obligation not to endanger the Belgium federal regime.144
The suit could challenge the legality of a referendum held in Flanders alone145
and claim that whatever its outcome, Flanders could not unilaterally declare its
independence. It is likely the Belgian court would follow the Canadian ruling in
the Secession Reference146 that a referendum in favor of secession in Quebec
could not establish the basis for unilateral secession; it could do no more than
create a duty for Quebec and the other Canadian provinces to negotiate in good
faith.147 And in good-faith negotiations, there would be no need for the
francophone parties to agree to Flemish independence.
External international pressures might also discourage Flemish secession.
International law strongly discourages unilateral secession because it violates
state sovereignty, which is at the center of the international system.148 The issue
of Flemish secession could be brought before the European Court of Justice,149
but here, too, the probability of Flemish success is low. Although those seeking
Flemish independence would no doubt claim that as a people they have a right
to self-determination, the international community would probably have little
sympathy for the claim. Particularly in light of the substantial grant of
autonomy the Flemish presently have within Belgium, they cannot credibly
claim they are prevented from participating in the political, economic, and

144. ALEN & MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 414.
145. Even a general national referendum is problematic from a constitutional point of view. Indeed,
although the Constitution is silent in this respect, Alen points out that both legal scholarship as well as a
constant position of the Department of Legislation of the Council of State hold that a referendum,
binding or not, is unconstitutional. Since 1999, as amended in 2005, article 41 of the Constitution
provides for one exception: a nonbinding referendum on the municipal and provincial level. See ALEN
& MUYLLE, supra note 25, § 108–13. There has been one national referendum in Belgian history, on
the fate of King Leopold III after World War II, in 1950. Although there was a majority vote in favor of
the King, unraveling the result shows pronounced regional differences. The pro votes were 72% in
Flanders against 58% in Wallonia and only 52% in Brussels. This led to mass protests, riots, even one
death; and to avoid the risk of a civil war, the King resigned and passed the throne upon his son, the
young Baldwin (Boudewijn/Baudouin). The present King Albert II (since 1993) is his brother. See
MCRAE, supra note 5, at 111.
146. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217.
147. Id.
148. See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, SELF-DETERMINATION OF PEOPLES: A LEGAL
REAPPRAISAL (1995).
149. The Final Act of Helsinki lays out an expanded view of self-determination:
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their right to selfdetermination, acting at all times in conformity with [governing principles] . . . including those
related to the territorial integrity of States. By virtue of the principle of equal rights and selfdetermination of peoples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine,
when and as they wish, their internal and external political status . . . .
Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe, art. 1(a)(VIII), Aug. 1, 1975, 14
I.L.M. 1292 (emphasis added). Cassese argues that the term “peoples” does not refer to internal
minorities but to entire populations of states. See CASSESE, supra note 148, at 59. This conclusion is
supported by the clause affirming the importance of territorial integrity. What the Final Act of Helsinki
authorizes is separation (or unification, since the unification of Germany was what most states had on
their mind when this was drafted) when it is decided by the entire population of a state through a
democratic procedure. Therefore a referendum held just in Flanders would not meet the requirement.
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social decisionmaking process of the state. They are not an oppressed minority,
but a majority who are on average richer than members of the francophone
community.
Finally, any attempt at Flemish secession must be examined in the context
of the European Union. For the EU, the dissolution of Belgium would probably
be seen as a threatening precedent, given the internal cleavages in other EU
countries, most notably in Spain, but also in the United Kingdom. Moreover,
Belgium plays an integral role in the stability of the EU because Brussels is the
home of many institutions of the European Union. The EU and many member
states would no doubt apply a great deal of pressure on the parties to negotiate
a resolution of the conflict short of Flemish independence.
Notwithstanding all these impediments, a hard-nosed realist would
recognize that if the Flemish parliament declared independence after a
referendum in which a substantial majority of the Flemish people voted in favor
of that outcome, Flanders—like Slovenia—could probably secede and
ultimately secure international recognition of its independence. There would be
no civil war, and Flanders would probably become a member of the EU. In fact,
the very existence of the EU as a supranational structure of twenty-seven
countries, sharing common values and norms, might, paradoxically, facilitate
the breakup of a country: because of the EU, a new entity does not have to
worry about security and economic self-sufficiency, which are often deterrents
to declaring independence, particularly for small states.150
Flemish independence remains unlikely, however, especially given the
preferences of the mainstream political parties on both sides of the language
cleavage. With the exception of the Vlaams Belang and the N-VA, all of these
parties would prefer further devolution to Flemish secession. Unilateral
secession, therefore, seems highly unlikely unless the francophone parties
refuse to make any concessions, and a substantial Flemish majority finds the
stalemate intolerable because the economic burdens of remaining hitched to the
Walloons outweigh the risks of independence.
The eventual outcome of the conflict probably will be yet another Belgian
compromise—a complex and obscure deal that involves some modest degree of
entitlement reform, and perhaps some further devolution but coupled with
transitional transfer payments from Flanders to ease the impact in the Walloon
region and Brussels.151

150. Some European countries opposed the recognition of the independence of Kosovo, which had
relatively undeveloped political institutions and little internal capacity to maintain local order. This
would not be true if the Flemish region seceded. Spain (worried about Basque secession) did not
recognize Kosovo’s independence.
151. Cf. Swenden & Jans, supra note 66, at 892 (predicting a gradual “unravel[]ing of the Belgian
cent[er])”).
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V
LESSONS
The political crisis within Belgium following the June 2007 national elections
alerted the outside world to the possibility that Belgium might go the way of
Czechoslovakia and split up. Although the profound social divisions based on
language and culture had been longstanding, the rest of the world had little idea
that the internal schism in the heart of Europe was so serious. The good news is
that the conflict likely will remain nonviolent. The bad news is that national
reconciliation is unlikely.
A. Why No Violence?
The obscurity of this conflict was and is due to the absence of violence and
bloodshed. Apart from the Belgians’ shared cultural commitment to
pragmatism and compromise,152 why might this be so?
1. Geography
Most Walloons and Flemish are able to live their day-to-day lives with little
contact with the “other.” With the exception of Brussels, there is little
residential integration. Ethnically and linguistically distinct institutions can exist
without threatening the other ethno-linguistic group.
2. The Stakes of the Conflict
Neither the Francophones nor the Flemish see their conflict as existential—
threatening their core identity or their ability to survive as a people.
Francophone and Dutch-speaking Belgians have both achieved linguistic and
cultural autonomy, and they control a broad range of governmental policies.
Moreover, given the existence of the EU, many policies will be set at the
supranational level regardless of whether Flanders remains a part of Belgium.
The Flemish Manifesto produced late in 2005 contains mainly pragmatic and
utilitarian arguments regarding the bureaucratic and economic issues affecting
the country. No arguments are based on deep issues of corrective justice or
ethnic supremacy.
Perhaps more important, no historical memories of mass violence exist
between the two sides. The Walloons and the Flemish tend to see each other
not as enemies, who must be demonized, but as peoples with distinctly different
cultures and incongruent interests. There is no dehumanization, repression, or a
vicious cycle of revenge such as those remaining predominant factors in other
ethnic conflicts around the world. Furthermore, the conflict occurs within a
state that has strong cultural and institutional support for the rule of law and
the capacity to rebuke, step in, and stop threats of violence.

152. See supra IV.B.2.
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3. Economics
In spite of the fundamental economic crisis, Belgium remains a rich country,
and economic disparities between the two peoples are not vast. The average per
capita income of the Walloons is about three-quarters that of the Flemish.153 By
international standards both the Walloons and the Flemish are well off. This is
in stark contrast to many other ethnic conflicts, in which gross economic
disparities exacerbate the tensions. For example, the economic disparity of the
Israelis and the Palestinians is enormous: the average per capita GDP for
Israelis is about $26,600 while that of Palestinians living in the territories is
about $1,100. 154
4. The Federal System and the Political Elite
The federal system makes it possible, even easy, for the two groups to “live
together apart.” The highly inefficient system of government frustrates both the
Flemish and the Walloons. Yet governance can occur, “not in spite of the
multiple divisions and the apparent internal difficulties . . . , but because of
them.”155 This is what one leading politician has called “the charm of a
permanent crisis.”156 The continual threat of dissolution creates the central force
uniting the two sides, both horizontally (across the regions and language
communities) and vertically (between a particular region and community and
the national government). The political elites are bound to each other because
each knows and fears that not finding a solution is a failure that may ultimately
diminish his or her own power. Thus, politicians continue to function “within
the ‘shadow of entropy.’”157 Inefficiency and frustration, and possibly
corruption, favoritism, the lack of transparency, and instability, might be the
price of maintaining a unified Belgium.158 Although the recent crisis has heavily
tested the limits of this model, which at moments seemed ready to explode, the
interim-government solution is yet another proof of the survival talents of
Belgian politicians. When the heat becomes intolerable, all parties move to cool
things down. This approach is facilitated by a shared cultural commitment to
pragmatism and compromise.159
B. Why No Reconciliation?
An interesting question relates to reconciliation. If there is no violence, why
is there no reconciliation? Why will the characteristics that have led to an
153. See Robert H. Mnookin, Ethnic Conflicts: Flemings & Walloons, Palestinians & Israelis, 136
DAEDALUS 103, 119 (2007).
154. Compare CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: ISRAEL (2008), https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the
-world-factbook/geos/is.html, with CIA WORLD FACTBOOK: GAZA STRIP (2008), https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/gz.html.
155. Peters, supra note 135, at 1085.
156. Confidential interview. See supra note 69.
157. Peters, supra note 135, at 1086.
158. Id. at 1086–88.
159. See supra IV.B.2.
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absence of violence not allow for a reconciliation in which the Belgian marriage
is strengthened?
What could be done to strengthen the glue? To promote reconciliation? To
strengthen a national Belgian identity?160 We can imagine a variety of actions
that might contribute to reconciliation. The media might play a more
161
constructive role if it were less parochial. Policies promoting bilingualism
could stimulate greater social integration over the long run. Electoral reforms
creating cross-regional electoral districts would encourage the development of
national political parties.162
But, frankly, it is too late. A deep reconciliation is not in the cards. Things
have gone too far.
There appears to be little interest in reconciliation or in further integration.
Today’s debate rests instead on whether Belgium’s two parts should separate
further. Apart from the monarchy, the institutional mechanisms that might
stimulate interest in reconciliation are lacking. The most important implication
of this analysis relates to both the opportunities and limitations of using a
federal regime to resolve internal conflicts. The good news is that the Belgian
federal system—though complicated and inefficient—has helped cabin this
conflict and contribute to the absence of violence. It has allowed those on either
side of the ethnic and cultural divide to have a greater sense that they can assert
a substantial degree of autonomy. But the bad news is that the federal system
has not resolved the conflict, much less led to reconciliation, and may have
contributed to the amplification of the centrifugal forces that may eventually
lead to the breakup of the nation.
One possible explanation is that the interests of the parties have changed. In
the 1970s, the Flemish wanted greater language and cultural rights and the
Walloons wanted greater subsidies. Deals could be made in which the Walloons
accepted federalism and devolution in exchange for money. However, the
Flemish now have serious concerns about cross-subsidies at present levels. The
mechanism used in the past, with the Flemish “buying” more autonomy through
money transfers, no longer seems to be politically feasible. Flanders is also
worried about its future prosperity and is thus reluctant to continue offering a
blank check without any terms or conditions of responsibility on the
beneficiary’s side. This new conflict also suggests a problem with using

160. Tom Tyler suggests that it is superordinate identification that is important in shaping people’s
political attitudes and actions. See Tyler, supra note 133.
161. See IS DEMOCRACY VIABLE WITHOUT A UNIFIED PUBLIC OPINION? THE SWISS
EXPERIENCE AND THE BELGIAN CASE (Dave Sinardet & Marc Hooghe eds., 2009), available at
http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-3-democracy-without-unified-publicopinion; Martin Euwema & Alain Verbeke, Negative and Positive Roles of Media in the Belgian
Conflict: A Model for De-escalation, 93 MARQ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2009).
162. See KRIS DESCHOUWER & PHILIPPE VAN PARIJS, ELECTORAL ENGINEERING FOR A
STALLED FEDERATION: A COUNTRY-WIDE ELECTORAL DISTRICT FOR BELGIUM’S FEDERAL
PARLIAMENT (2009), available at http://www.rethinkingbelgium.eu/rebel-initiative-ebooks/ebook-4electoral-engineering-stalled-federation.
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federalism to resolve ethnic conflict, namely, that giving a group some
autonomy might only increase its desire for more autonomy, thereby destroying
any hope for full reconciliation.
C. Living Apart Together
Returning to the metaphor of the married couple, we think there will be no
divorce, but there is no real prospect of living together under a strong national
government. We believe that the goal should be a civilized separation without
divorce, not the resurrection of an intimate marriage with deep attachments.
Belgium’s future lies in a model of living apart together—in which the spouses
can do business with each other, have some shared assets, and treat each other
with respect. Such a relationship requires the capacity to communicate
effectively.
Separating spouses who both want a continuing relationship with the
children cannot make a “clean break.” They must continue to have some sort of
relationship with each other, since they remain parents if not partners. In
Dividing the Child, Maccoby and Mnookin identify three common patterns of
co-parenting relationships after the breakup.163 The most common is spousal
disengagement, which essentially involves parallel parenting with little
communication. A second pattern is conflictual, with parents exhibiting and
communicating high levels of emotion. The third pattern is cooperative, in
which high communication leads to low conflict. The impact on the children is
predictable: in the conflict pattern the children are caught in the middle and are
adversely affected; in the disengagement pattern, the effects on children are
intermediate; the cooperative pattern conveys real psychological, social, and
economic benefits to the children.
The marriage analogy is suggestive. In considering the organization of
Belgium’s separation, it would be desirable to move toward a more cooperative
pattern of communication.164 Elites on both sides should invest time and energy
into creating more empathy, respect, and trust between the communities. They
should underscore the mutual benefits of a more collaborative association.165
These actions will require greater tolerance on both sides. But the goal would
not be to create a stronger national state but instead to enhance the benefits of
a federal structure that provides substantial autonomy for each community.

163. ELEANOR MACCOBY & ROBERT MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD 276–78 (1992).
164. Cf. Deschouwer, supra note 93, at 908–09 (explaining that one scenario for the future could be
a learning process in which the new political elite sees the benefits of a more accommodating attitude).
165. For an example of how such a constructive dialogue might be implemented, see Jennifer Pratt
Miles, Examining the Applicability of the Concepts of Apology, Forgiveness, and Reconciliation to
Multi-Stakeholder, Collaborative Problem-Solving Processes, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 193 (Spring
2009). Pratt Miles suggests using the Transitions Framework of William Bridges, articulating the
Flemish past and the Wallonian present as losses, and thinking through potential ways to replace,
restore, or address those losses.

